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Abstract. The consideration of security requirements in the development of
multi-agent systems is a very difficult task. However, only few approaches have
been proposed that try to integrate security issues as internal part of the
development process. Amongst them, secure Tropos has been proposed as a
structured approach towards the consideration of security issues in the
development of multiagent systems. In this paper we enhance secure Tropos by
integrating to its stages: (i) a process for selecting amongst alternative
architectural styles using as criteria the security requirements of the system; (ii)
a pattern-based approach to transform security requirements to design, and (iii)
a security attack scenarios approach to test the developed solution. The
electronic single assessment process (eSAP) case study is used to illustrate our
approach.
1 Introduction
Recently agent orientation is presented as the next major paradigm for the
development of large complex computer systems. Although there are some
convincing arguments for believing that agent orientation will be of benefit for
engineering certain complex software systems [6], much work is still required so that
it becomes widely accepted as a major development paradigm, and more research is
required towards many areas related to it. One of these areas is security.
Security of information systems is an area that has received great attention the last
few decades mainly due to the storage of sensitive information on computer systems,
and the wide interconnection of these systems through networks and the Internet. As a
result, security research is considered one of the most active areas of computer
science and engineering research. Nevertheless the high amount of work on this area,
current information systems are not considered totally secure. According to the U.S.
National Research Council [17] poor design is one of the major reasons for the
development of insecure systems. Current work on information systems security has
been focused on the development and verification of security protocols and other low
level solutions, and the consideration of security requirements as part of the whole
system development has been neglected.
This is also the case for multiagent systems, since current agent oriented
methodologies do not usually consider security as an integral part of their
development stages and as a result agent developers do not actually find any help
when considering security during the stages of the system development. This is
mainly because the consideration of security in the development phases is a
demanding and difficult task, due to the following reasons:
(a) developers, who are not security specialists, usually need to develop
multiagent systems that require knowledge of security;
(b) Many different concepts are used between security specialists and software
engineers. As a result, there is an abstraction gap that makes the integration
of security and software engineering more difficult;
(c) there is an ad hoc approach towards security analysis;
(d) It is difficult to define together security and functional components and at the
same time provide a clear distinction. For instance, which components are
part of the security architecture and which ones are part of the functional
specification;
(e) It is difficult to move from a set of security requirements to a design that
satisfies these requirements, and also understand what are the consequences
of adopting specific design solutions for such requirements;
(f) It is difficult to get empirical evidence of security issues during the design
stages. This makes the process of analysing security during the design stage
more difficult;
(g)  It is difficult to fully test the proposed security solutions at the design level.
We believe that the agent oriented software engineering paradigm presents a
feasible approach for the integration of security to software engineering due to the
appropriateness of agent oriented philosophy, for dealing with the security issues that
exist in a computer system. Security requirements are mainly obtained by analysing
the attitude of the organisation towards security and after studying the security policy
of the organisation. As mentioned in [6] agents act on behalf of individuals or
companies interacting according to an underlying organisation context. The
integration of security within this context will require for the rest of the subsystems
(agents) to consider the security requirements, when specifying their objectives and
interactions therefore causing the propagation of security requirements to the rest of
the subsystem. In addition, the agent oriented view is perhaps the most natural way of
characterising security issues in software systems. Characteristics, such as autonomy,
intentionality and sociality, provided by the use of agent orientation allow developers
first to model the security requirements in high-level, and then incrementally
transform these requirements to security mechanisms [12].
In previous work [13, 14, 15] we have presented models and techniques towards
the solution of problems a, b, c, and d.  For example, we proposed a well guided
security-oriented process that considers the same concepts and notations throughout
the development lifecycle and it allows the parallel definition of security and
functional requirements providing at the same time a clear distinction.
In this paper we extend our previous work to deal with problems e, f and g by
extending the current secure Tropos. In particular, we propose a process for selecting
amongst alternative architectural styles, a pattern-based approach to transform the
3analysis to design, and a security attack scenarios approach to test the developed
solution.
Our work is not the only one in the agent paradigm pool that tries to integrate
security issues as an internal part of the development process. Liu et al. [10] presented
work in which security requirements are analysed as relationships between actors,
such as users, stakeholders and potential attackers. Liu proposes three different kinds
of analysis techniques: agent oriented, goal oriented and scenario based analysis.
Agent oriented analysis is used to model potential threats and security measures,
whereas goal oriented analysis is employed for the development of a catalogue to help
towards the identification of the different security relationships on the system. Finally,
the scenario based analysis is considered an elaboration of the other two kinds of
analysis. Yu and Cysneiros [21] use the concept of a soft-goal to assess different
design alternatives, and how each of these alternatives would contribute positively or
negatively in achieving the soft-goal. However, these approaches only guide the
consideration of security issues on specific development stages, in other words both
of them are focused only in the requirements engineering area. Our approach, in
contrast, considers security issues throughout the development process. As indicated
in [3], it is important to consider security issues throughout the development process.
Moreover, Huget [5] has proposed an agent oriented software methodology, called
Nemo, which considers some security aspects.  However, in his approach security is
not considered as a specific concept but it is integrated within the other models of the
methodology. As indicated earlier, it is important to model together security and
functional requirements but at the same time provide a clear distinction. Moreover,
Nemo tackles security quite superficially and as Huget states [5] “particularly,
security has to be intertwined more deeply within the models”.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 of the paper provides an
overview of secure Tropos, mainly for readers not familiar with the methodology,
whereas Section 3 introduces our approach providing answers to the problems e, f,
and g presented above. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 An overview of Secure Tropos
Tropos [1] is an agent oriented software engineering methodology, in which
notions such as actors (entities that have strategic goals and intentionality), goals (an
actor’s strategic interests), soft-goals (goals without clear criteria whether they are
satisfied or not), tasks (represent in an abstract level a way of doing something),
resources (represent a physical or informational entity) and intentional dependencies
(indicate that one actor depends on another in order to attain some goals, execute
some tasks, or deliver a resource) are used in all the phases of the system
development from the first phases of the early analysis, down to the actual
implementation.
The Tropos methodology is mainly based on four phases [1]: Early Requirements
Analysis, aimed at defining and understanding a problem by studying its existing
organizational setting; Late Requirements Analysis, conceived to define and describe
the system-to-be, in the context of its operational environment; Architectural Design,
that deals with the definition of the system global architecture in terms of subsystems;
and the Detailed Design phase, aimed at specifying each architectural component in
further detail, in terms of inputs, outputs, control and other relevant information.
During the phases of early and late requirements analysis Tropos employs two
main types of diagrams: the actor diagram and the goal diagram. An actor diagram,
describes the actors (depicted as circles), their goals (depicted as oval and bubble
shapes) and the network of dependency relationships amongst the actors (two arrowed
lines connected by a graphical symbol varying according to the dependum, i.e. goal,
task, or resource). An example is given in Figure 2. A goal diagram represents the
analysis of an actor’s goals, conducted from the view point of the actor, by using three
basic reasoning techniques: means-end analysis, contribution analysis and AND/OR
decomposition. It is drawn as a balloon and contains graphs whose nodes are goals
(ovals) and/or tasks (hexagonal shape) and whose arcs are the different relationships
that can be identified among its nodes. An example is given in Figure 3.
Although, the Tropos methodology was not conceived with security in mind, we
have presented in previous work a set of security related concepts [13, 14, 15] (some
resulted from security related extensions of existing concepts), to enable it to model
security issues throughout the development of multiagent systems. This security
oriented extension, which is known as secure Tropos, includes the following security
related concepts.
A security constraint is defined as a restriction related to security issues, such as
privacy, integrity and availability, which can influence the analysis and design of the
information system under development by restricting some alternative design
solutions, by conflicting with some of the requirements of the system, or by refining
some of the system’s objectives [12]. Graphically a security constraint is depicted as a
cloud and it is positioned in the side of the actor who has to satisfy it (see for instance
Figure 2).
Additionally to security constraints, Secure Tropos defines secure dependencies. A
secure dependency introduces security constraint(s) that must be fulfilled for the
dependency to be satisfied. Both the depender and the dependee must agree for the
fulfilment of the security constraint in order for the secure dependency to be valid.
That means the depender expects from the dependee to satisfy the security
constraint(s) and also that the dependee will make an effort to deliver the dependum
by satisfying the security constraint(s).
Secure Tropos uses the term secure entity to describe any goals and tasks related to
the security of the system. A secure goal represents the strategic interests of an actor
with respect to security. Secure goals are mainly introduced in order to achieve
possible security constraints that are imposed to an actor or exist in the system.
However, a secure goal does not particularly define how the security constraints can
be achieved, since alternatives can be considered [12].
The precise definition of how the secure goal can be achieved is given by a secure
task.  A secure task is defined as a task that represents a particular way for satisfying
a secure goal.   
5Fig. 1.  Tropos and Secure Tropos notation
It is worth mentioning that the process in secure Tropos is one of analysing the
security needs of the stakeholders and the system in terms of security constraints
imposed to the stakeholders (early requirements) and the system (late requirements),
identifying secure entities that guarantee the satisfaction of the security constraints,
and assigning capabilities to the system (architectural design) to help towards the
satisfaction of the secure entities. Security requirements are identified by employing
the modelling activities of secure Tropos [12], such as security reference diagram
construction, security constraints and secure entities modelling. In particular, the
security constraints imposed to the system and the stakeholders, are identified and
secure goals and entities that guarantee the satisfaction of the identified security
constraints are imposed to the actors of the system.
The secure Tropos process allows for two types of validation. A model validation
and design validation. The model validation involves the validation of the developed
models (for example, the goal diagram or the actor diagram) with the aid of a set of
validation rules [12]. The design validation aims to validate the developed solution
against the security policy of the system. A key feature of the Secure Tropos that
allows us to perform such a validation is the fact that the same secure concepts are
used throughout the development stage. Moreover, the definition of these concepts
allows us to provide a direct map between them, and therefore be able to validate
whether the proposed security solution satisfies the security policy.
3 Enhancing secure Tropos
Secure Tropos provides solutions towards the first four problems identified in the
Introduction. The approach described in this section enhances our work on secure
Tropos in order to provide answers to problems e, f, and g. To achieve this aim, we
integrate into the current secure Tropos process three sub-activities; (1) the system’s
architectural style selection according to its security requirements; (2) the
transformation of the security requirements to a design that satisfies these
requirements; (3) and the attack testing of the multiagent system under development.
3.1 Illustrating the approach
To better illustrate the above sub-activities and their integration within the secure
Tropos, we consider a complete description of the electronic single assessment
process (eSAP) case study that we have introduced in previous work [16]. After
analyzing the security requirements of the individual actors during the early
requirements analysis [12], the electronic Single Assessment Process system (eSAP)
is introduced and responsibility is delegated to it for some of the actors’ goals. Since
dependencies are delegated from the actors to the eSAP system, possible security
constraints regarding those dependencies are also delegated as shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 3. Actor’s diagram including the eSAP system
For example, before the introduction of the eSAP system, the Social Worker  was
depending on the Nurse to Obtain Older Person Information . However, this secure
dependency involves the security constraint (restricting the Nurse) Sha re
Information Only if Consent Obtained . With the introduction of the eSAP system,
the Social Worker  actor depends on the eSAP  to Obtain Older Person
Information, therefore the eSAP becomes responsible for satisfying the Share
7Information Only if Consent Obtained  security constraint that is delegated together
with the secure dependency.
Then, the eSAP system is analysed and secure goals/tasks are imposed to the
system to help towards the satisfaction of its security constraints as shown in Figure 3.
For example, the Keep System Data Private  security constraint can be fulfilled by
blocking access to the system, by allowing access only from a central computer, or by
ensuring system privacy.  However, the first two contribute negatively to the usability
of the system, i.e. the system will be secure but it will not be used. On the other hand,
the Ensure System Privacy  secure goal is considered the best solution since it
provides security to the system and it doesn’t affect (dramatically) its usability.
Fig. 4. Goal diagram for the eSAP system
When the requirements analysis is complete, the next stage is the architectural
design. According to [2] one of the most important issues is to identify the
architectural style that is more suitable for the eSAP system. For instance, we could
try to identify whether a client/server or a mobile agent architectural style is more
suitable for our system.
3.1.1 Selecting the system’s architecture according to its security requirements
An important requirement of a security-oriented approach is to allow developers to
explore different architectural designs or in other words, to allow developers to reason
about alternative design solutions according to the security requirements of a
multiagent system.
For this reason, this research has developed an analysis technique to enable
developers to select among alternative architectural styles1 using as criteria the non-
functional requirements of the multiagent system under development. Although, this
process can be used to select an architectural style according to any of the non-
functional requirements of the system, as mentioned above, one of the most important
issues in the eSAP is security. Consequently it is natural to decide about the
architectural style of the system taking into account the issues involved, in other
words the system’s security requirements.
We use the measure of satisfiability [4] to compare different architectural styles
with respect to non-functional requirements (such as security). Satisfiability
represents the probability that a non-functional requirement will be satisfied. The
contribution of each style to the satisfiability of  non-functional requirements is
expressed by a weight ranging between 0 and 1. For example, 0.1 means the
probability that the architectural style will satisfy the  non-functional requirement is
very low (the style is not suitable for satisfying the requirement). On the other hand, a
weight of 0.9 means the probability that the architectural style will satisfy the non-
functional requirement is very high (the style is suitable for satisfying the
requirement).
The weights of the contribution links are assigned after reviewing different studies,
evaluations, and comparisons involving the architectural styles under evaluation.
Figure 4 indicates the non-functional requirements of the eSAP system (as identified
during the early and late requirements analysis –Figures 2,3) along with the
satisfiability contributions from the client/server and the mobile agents architectural
styles.
When the contribution weights for each architectural style to the different non-
functional requirements of the system have been assigned, the best-suited
architectural style is decided. This decision involves the categorization of the non-
functional requirements according to the importance to the system and the
identification of the architectural style that best satisfies the most important non-
functional requirement using a propagation algorithm, such as the one presented by
Giorgini et al. [4].
From earlier analysis (see Figure 3) it is concluded that security of the eSAP involves
privacy, integrity and availability. Therefore, it is desirable to select a suitable
architectural style for the system having these security requirements as criteria.
According to the propagation algorithm, the satisfiability for the security is given by
the following:
S (security) = Min (S (Privacy), S (integrity), S (availability))
where
S (Integrity) = Min (S (Collect auditing data), S (check Data Integrity))
S (Privacy) = Min (S (check data for consent), S (Check access control), S (Check authentication), S
(Check Information Flow), S (Check Cryptography))
S (Availability) = Min (S (Back up procedures), S (Recoverability))
                                                           
1 To avoid confusion it must be noted that architectural styles differ from architectures in that “
a style can be thought of as a set of constraints on an architecture” [Bas98].
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In the presented example, for the client/server architecture we have the following
values (as derived from Figure 4): S (Collect auditing data) = 0.8, S (check Data Integrity) = 0.8, S (check
data for consent) = 0.8, S (Check access control) = 0.8, S (Check authentication) =0.8,  S (Check Information Flow) =0.8,
S (Check Cryptography)  =0.8, S (Back up procedures) =0.6, S (Recoverability)  =0.6.
Therefore, S (Integrity) =0.8, S (Privacy) = 0.8,S (Availability)  = 0.6, and as a result S
(Security) = 0.6. that means the probability that the client/server architecture will
satisfy the security requirements of the system is 60%.
Applying the same technique to calculate the probability that the mobile agent will
satisfy the security requirements of the system we have the following:
S (Collect auditing data) = 0.7, S (check Data Integrity) = 0.6, S (check data for consent) = 0.8, S (Check access
control) = 0.7, S (Check authentication) =0.7, S (Check Information Flow) =0.4, S (Check Cryptography) =0.6, S (Back
up procedures) =0.8, S (Recoverability) =0.8.
Therefore, S (Integrity) =0.6, S (Privacy) = 0.4, S (Availability) = 0.8, and as a result S
(Security) = 0.4, meaning that the probability that the mobile agents architectural style
will satisfy the security requirements of the system is 40%.
As a result, for the given security requirements, the client/server style satisfies
better the security of the eSAP system.
3.1.2 Transform the analysis to design
When the architectural style has been chosen, the next step of the architectural
design stage aims to decompose the system in order to identify internal actors who
will satisfy the system’s (secure) goals. In the presented example, the eSAP actor is
decomposed  to internal actors and the responsibility for the fulfilment of the eSAP’s
goals is delegated to these actors as shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 7. eSAP actor partial decomposition
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For instance, the Evaluate Assessment Information  goal is delegated to the
Assessment Evaluator , whereas the Provide Assessment Information  goal is
delegated to the Assessment Broker . In addition, the Older Person Broker  and the
Consent Manager actors have been introduced to the eSAP system to fulfill the
responsibility of the eSAP system to satisfy the secure dependency Obtain Older
Person Information  together with the Share Information Only if Consent
Obtained security constraint.
With respect to security the identification of some of the actors is a difficult task,
especially for developers with minimum knowledge of security. To help developers,
security patterns can be used. “A security pattern describes a particular recurring
security problem that arises in specific contexts and presents a well-proven generic
scheme for its solution” [19]. In other words, security patterns document proven
solutions to security related problems in such a way that are applicable by non-
security specialists. Therefore, the application of security patterns in the development
of multiagent systems can greatly help to identify the required actors in a structured
manner that does not put in danger the security of the system by providing a solution
customised to the problem. The use of security patterns enables non-security
specialists to identify patterns for transforming the security requirements of their
system into design, and also be aware of the consequences that each of the applied
security patterns introduce to their system. Additionally, because security patterns
capture well-proven solutions, it is more likely that the application of security patterns
will satisfy the security requirements of the system.
Therefore, we have developed a security pattern language [15] and we have
integrated it within our security-oriented process. Figure 6 describes the relationship
of the patterns of the language as well as their relationship with existing patterns.
Each box indicates a pattern, where a solid-line box indicates a security pattern that
belongs to the language developed by this research and a dashed-line box indicates a
related existing pattern. White triangles depict generalisations/ specialisation and
solid lines associations of type uses/ requires.
Fig. 8. The pattern language roadmap
The AGENCY GUARD  is the starting point of applying the patterns of the
language and it is a variant of the Embassy [7] and the Proxy [18] patterns. It uses the
AGENT AUTHENTICATOR  pattern to ensure the identity of the agents, the
SANDBOX  pattern in order to restrict the actions of agents, and the ACCESS
CONTROLER pattern to restrict access to the system resources.
On the other hand, the SANDBOX pattern can implement the Checkpoint [20]
pattern, and the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR  pattern can use the Session [20] pattern
to store credentials of the agent. Moreover, the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR
employs the Cryptographic Key Generation [9] and the Cryptographic Key Exchange
[9] patterns for further cryptographic actions.
To understand how the patterns of the language can be applied during the
development of a system, consider the internal analysis of the eSAP system (see
Figure 3). It was concluded that Information Flow , Authentication and Access
Control checks must be performed in order for the eSAP system to satisfy the secure
goal Ensure System Privacy . In the case of the Information Flow secure task, the
eSAP  should be able to control how information flows within the system, and
between the system and other actors. For example, the system should be able to
control who requires access to the system and, by considering the security policy, to
grant or deny access to the system. With respect to the Authentication checks, the
system should be able to authenticate any agents that send a request to access
information of the system, and in the case of the Access Control, the system should
be able to control access to its resources. To meet these goals, The AGENCY
GUARD pattern can be used to grant/deny access to the system according to the
security policy, the AGENT AUTHENTICATOR  pattern can be used to provide
authentication checks and the ACCESS CONTROLER  pattern to perform access
control checks as shown in Figure 7.  The use of these patterns not only satisfies the
fulfillment of the secure goals of the system but also guarantees the validity of the
solution.
Moreover, developers know the consequences that each pattern introduces to the
system. In the presented example, for instance, the application of the AGENCY
GUARD  means that only the AGENCY GUARD  must be tested for correct
enforcement of the agency’s security policy (consequence), the application of the
AGENT AUTHENTICATOR  means that during implementation only the AGENT
AUTHENTICATOR must be checked for assurance (consequence), whereas the
application of the ACCESS CONTROLER  means that different policies can be used
for accessing different resources (consequence).
                                                           
2 The use of italics in this section indicates patterns not developed by this research
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Fig. 9. Using the pattern language
3.1.3 Testing the developed solution
When the agents of the system have been identified along with their secure
capabilities, it is very important for developers to test how their solution copes with
potential attacks. For this reason, we have developed a process that is based on
security attack scenarios.
A Security Attack Scenario  (SAS) is defined as an attack situation describing
the agents of a multiagent system and their secure capabilities as well as possible
attackers and their goals, and it identifies how the secure capabilities of the system
prevent (if they prevent) the satisfaction of the attackers’ goals.
Security attack scenarios aim to test how the system copes with different kinds of
security attacks. Therefore a scenario includes enough information about the system
and its environment to allow validation of the security requirements. A security attack
scenario involves possible attacks to a multiagent system, a possible attacker, the
resources that are attacked, and the agents of the system related to the attack. An
attacker is depicted as an agent who aims to break the security of the system. The
attacker intentions are modelled as goals and tasks and their analysis follows the same
reasoning techniques that the Tropos methodology employs for goal and task analysis.
Attacks are depicted as dash-lined links, called attack links, which contain an
“attacks” tag, starting from one of the attacker’s goals and ending at the attacked
resource.
The process is divided into three main stages [12]: creation of the scenario ,
validation of the scenario , and testing and redefinition  of the system according to
the scenario. Even though the presented process is introduced as a sequence of stages,
in reality is highly iterative and stages can be interchanged according to the
perception of the developers.  During the creation of a scenario, Tropos goal diagram
notation is used for analysing the intentions of an attacker in terms of goals and tasks,
identify a set of attacks according to the attacker’s goals, and also identify the agents
of the system that posses capabilities to prevent the identified attacks.  Therefore, the
agents of the system related to the identified attack(s) are modelled. The secure
capabilities, of each agent, that help to prevent the identified attacks are identified and
dashed-links (with the tag “help”) are provided indicating the capability and the attack
they help to prevent.
When the scenarios have been created, they must be validated. Therefore, during
the scenario validation process software inspections [8] are used. The inspection of
the scenarios involves the identification of any possible violations of the Tropos
syntax and of any possible inconsistencies between the scenarios and the models of
the previous stages. Such an inspection involves the use of validation checklists. Such
a check list has been proposed for instance in [12].
Although inspections have been proposed by this research for the validation of the
security attack scenarios, other techniques could also be applied depending on the
developers’ experience and the nature of the system. For instance, two well known
validation techniques for requirements specification are walkthroughs and prototyping
[8].
When the scenarios have been validated, the next step aims to identify test cases
and test, using those test cases, the security of the system against any potential
attacks. Each test case is derived from a possible attack depicted in the security attack
scenarios. Each test case includes a precondition (the state of the system before the
attack), a system expected security reaction  (how the system reacts in the attack),
a discussion that forms the basis for the decision regarding the test case, and a test
case result  that indicates the outputs of the test case.
The test cases are applied and a decision is formed to whether the system can
prevent the identified attacks or not. The decision whether an attack can be prevented
(and in what degree) or not lies on the developer. However as an indication of the
decision it must be taken into consideration that at least one secure capability must
help an attack, in order for the developer to decide the attack can be prevented.
Attacks that cannot be prevented are notated as solid attack links, as opposed to
attacks that the system can prevent and which are notated as dashed attack links.
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For each attack that it has been decided it cannot be prevented, extra capabilities
must be assigned to the system to help towards the prevention of that attack. In
general, the assignment of extra secure capabilities is not a unique process and
depends on the perception of the developer regarding the attack dangers. However, a
good approach could be to analyse the capabilities of the attacker used to perform the
attack and assign the system with capabilities that can revoke the attacker’s
capabilities. For instance, consider the scenario related to the eSAP in which the
Social Worker  wishes to obtain an Assessment Evaluation , and an Attacker
wishes to attack the integrity of the eSAP system. As identified in the analysis of the
security reference diagram [12], three main threats are involved in this kind of attack,
cryptographic attacks , care plan changing  and viruses. Therefore, the Attacker’s
main goal, Attack eSAP Integrity , can be decomposed to Modify Content of
Messages, Change Values in Data Files , and Alter Programs to Perform
Differently as shown in Figure 8.
The first sub-goal involves the Attacker trying to modify the content of any
messages transmitted over the network. To fulfill this goal, the Attacker might try to
employ cryptographic attacks to any resource transmitted between any external actors
and the eSAP system. The second sub-goal indicates the Attacker trying to change
the values in data files of the system. The fulfilment of this goal can be satisfied by
means of changing the data of resources stored in the eSAP system. The third sub-
goal indicates the attempt of the Attacker to alter a program so it performs
differently. Mainly this can be achieved using viruses that can alter the behaviour of
specific programs (agents) in order to enable the attacker to gain access to the system
or to system’s information.
Three main test cases are identified for this scenario [12], cryptographic attacks ,
data changing attacks  and viruses attacks. For each of these attacks, a test case is
constructed. In this paper we only present the password sniffing and the viruses test
cases as shown in Table 1 and 2. By applying different test cases many useful results
can be obtained about a system. For instance, for the presented case study the test case
of the modification attack scenario identified that an agent should be introduced to the
system to monitor the eSAP and take effective measurements against any possible
viruses.
Fig. 11. An example of an attack scenario
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Test Case 1: Password sniffing
Precondition: The Social Worker  tries to obtain access to the eSAP system by
providing their authorisation details. The Attacker tries to intercept the authorisation
details.
System expected security reaction: prevent the Attacker from obtaining users’
passwords
Discussion: the main target of the Attacker would be all the resource transmitions
between the Social Worker  and the eSAP  system that contain any kind of
authorisation details. Although authorisation details are enrypted, this is not enough
since password sniffing takes place from a compromised computer belonging to the
network. As a result, the Attacker is able to decrypt any message. A good technique to
defend against password sniffing is to use one-time-passwords. A one-time-password is
a password that is valid for only one use. After this use, it is not longer valid, and so
even if the Attacker obtains such a password it is useless.  However, the users must be
able to gain access to the system more than once. This can be accomplished with what
is commonly  known as a password list. Each time a user tries to access the system they
provide a different password from a list of passwords.
Test Case Result: Currently the system fails to adeqautely protect against password
sniffing attacks. For the eSAP system to be able to react in a password sniffing attack,
the external agents of the system (such as the Nurse, the Social Worker , the Older
Person) must be provided with capabilities to provide passwords from a password list.
Table 1. The password sniffing
Test Case 2: Viruses
Precondition: The Attacker tries to change the system behaviour by using some
kind of virus.
System expected security reaction: The system should be able to prevent viruses.
Discussion: Viruses consist one of the most sophisticated threats to computer
systems. It is quite common for attackers to send viruses to computer systems they
want to attack in order to exploit vulnerabilities and change the behaviour of the
system. Although many effective countermeasures have been developed for
existing types of viruses, many new types of viruses are also developed frequently.
An ideal measurement against viruses is prevention. In other words, viruses should
not get into the system. However, this is almost impossible to achieve. Therefore,
the best approach is to be able to detect, identify and remove a virus. Auditing
helps towards the detection of the virus. However, apart from this the eSAP
system is not protected against viruses.
Test Case Results: The eSAP system needs to be integrated with an anti-virus
program to enable it to effectively detect, identify and remove any possible viruses.
Such a program, which could be another internal agent of the eSAP system,
should be able to monitor the system and take effective measurements against any
possible viruses.
Table 2. The viruses test case
By applying these test cases many useful results can be obtained for the system
under development. For instance, for the eSAP system, firstly it was identified that
the system provides enough protection against some of these attacks. Secondly, for
the attacks that the system did not provided adequately protection, extra agents and
extra secure capabilities were identified and modifications took place in the eSAP
system. For example, the external agents of the system were given the capability to
provide passwords from a password list, and the Authenticator was given capabilities
to successfully process such passwords. The lack of such capabilities was identified
by the application of the password-sniffing test case of the interception attack
scenario. Moreover, an agent, called Viruses Monitor , was introduced to the system
to monitor the eSAP and take effective measurements against any possible viruses.
The lack of such an agent was identified by the application of the viruses test case.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented an extension to the secure Tropos methodology to deal with
the problems e, f, and g identified in the Introduction. To achieve this aim, we have integrated
into the secure Tropos process three sub-activities; (1) the system’s architectural style selection
according to its security requirements; (2) the transformation of the security requirements to a
design that satisfies these requirements; (3) and the attack testing of the multiagent system
under development.
Each of those activities is important for the consideration of security for different
reasons. The technique for selecting amongst different architectural styles and its
integration within the Tropos methodology allows the explicit definition of the
technique and allows developers to evaluate and select between different designs
according to the system’s security requirements. This, in turn, allows developers to
analyse security requirements and base design solutions on this analysis. Moreover,
the integration of the pattern language within the development stages of the secure
Tropos allows novice security developers to reason about the consequences a
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particular design will have on their system, and therefore develop a design that will
satisfy the security requirements of the system.
On the other hand, the introduction of security attack scenarios to test the system’s
response to potential attacks allows developers to test the developed security solution
during the design stage. This, in turn, allows developers to re-consider particular
system functions with respect to security until the system under development satisfies
all the security requirements.
An important consideration of our approach is that it covers all the stages from the
early requirements down to design, using the same concepts and notation.  This is
important since it allows the validation of the developed security solution by tracking
the developed solution all the way back to the security requirements and the security
policy. Moreover, the illustrated approach is implementation independent. Although
many important issues may arise from the choice of a specific language, the
consideration of such issues as part of the proposed process would restrict developers
to specific solutions. We believe that a software engineering methodology should not
restrict developers, and this claim is supported by various researchers within the agent
oriented software engineering research area, as demonstrated by the development of a
huge amount of agent oriented methodologies (for example see [1, 5, 6] that claim to
be language independent and they do not consider implementation stages.
However, there are plans for future work. We first aim to integrate our approach
with other related approaches, such as UMLsec, in order to extend the applicability
domain. Secondly, we plan to develop tools that will allow to perform most of the,
manual for the time being, checking and validations automatically. Thirdly, we plan
to test the approach in a wider domain by using different case studies.
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